高管权力对债券融资成本的影响研究  

A Research on the Impact of Executive Power on Bond Financing Cost

作　　者：俞静[1] 徐小清 YU Jing;XU Xiaoqing(School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2019年第5期84-93,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL211)

摘　　要：基于我国债券市场数据,研究高管权力强度与权力维度对公司债券融资成本的影响,并进一步探讨产权性质与市场化进程对两者关系的调节作用。实证结果表明:(1)随着高管权力的增强,债券融资成本会随之增加,其中组织权力、所有权权力与债券融资成本显著正相关,个人能力权力与债券融资成本负相关但不显著。(2)相比于非国有企业,国有企业中高管权力与债券融资成本的正相关关系更加显著。(3)在市场化程度越低的地区,高管权力与债券融资成本的正相关关系越显著。Based on the data of bond market in China,this paper studies the impact of intensity and dimension of executive power on the cost of corporate bond financing,and further explores the moderating effect of property right nature and marketization process on the relationship between them.Empirical results show that:(1)with the enhancement of executive power,the cost of corporate bonds will increase.Executive organization power and ownership power are significantly and positively correlated with the cost of corporate bonds,while individual ability power is insignificantly and negatively related to the cost of corporate bonds.(2)Compared to non-state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between executive power and the cost of corporate bonds in state-owned enterprises is even more significant.(3)In the region with lower marketization progress,the positive correlation between executive power and the cost of corporate bonds is more significant.

关 键 词：高管权力 公司债券 信用利差 产权性质 市场化进程 债券融资成本 国有企业 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]