考虑服务水平影响需求的供应链微分博弈模型研究  

Supply Chain Differential Game Model Considering Service Level Affecting Demand

作　　者：赵威 温艳[1] 冯娜 ZHAO Wei;WEN Yan;FENG Na(College of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2019年第3期102-109,122,共9页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71771129)资助;青岛市博士后应用研究项目(批准号:40518060048)资助

摘　　要：针对供应链系统考虑服务水平影响需求时的均衡问题,利用微分博弈理论研究了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg博弈以及协同合作博弈三种情形下制造商服务投入水平、经销商服务投入水平、服务成本分担比例、双方及供应链系统的利润,并对其进行了比较分析。结果发现,协同合作博弈情形下制造商和经销商服务投入、顾客满意度以及供应链系统总利润都要优于非合作博弈情形,而且经销商服务投入的幅度取决于制造商对其服务成本的分担率。运用算例分析对结果进行了验证。The equilibrium problem considering the influence of service level factors in the supply chain is studied. The manufacturer service input, the retailer service input,the service cost sharing ratio, and the profit of both parties and the system as a whole under the equilibrium of the cooperative game is studied. The Nash game, Stackelberg game and Cooperative game is compared. It is found that the system profit, manufacturer and retailer service investment are better than the non-cooperative game situation under the cooperative game situation, and the retailer service input depends on the manufacturer's share of the service cost. The results is verified by a case study.

关 键 词：服务水平 微分博弈 供应链管理 

分 类 号：F403.6[经济管理—产业经济]