地方政府间治理空气污染行为的演化博弈与仿真研究  

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on the Act of Controlling Air Pollution between the Local Governments

作　　者：李俊杰 张红[2] LI JUN-jie;ZHANG Hong(School of Project Management and Real Estate,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Civil Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学工程管理与房地产学院,河南郑州450046 [2]清华大学土木水利学院,北京100084

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第8期27-34,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373143)

摘　　要：地方政府治理空气污染的执行力度是影响区域空气质量的直接因素,文中研究影响地方政府治理空气污染行为的因素。文章内容从演化博弈视角探讨地方政府自身及地方政府间协同治理空气污染的决策演化过程。研究显示,中央政府抽查行为,对地方政府的治理成本补贴,增大对地方政府的奖励与惩罚,增大对区域联合治理行为的惩罚与奖励,有助于提升地方政府治理空气污染行为的执行效力。研究结果表明,多元共治、互动监察、利益补偿等对提升地方空气污染治理的有效性具有重要意义。The implementation of local government’s control of air pollution is a direct factor affecting regional air quality. The paper studies the factors affecting local government’s behaviors of air pollution control. From the perspective of evolutionary game, the content of the paper explores the evolutionary process of making decisions that curb air pollution by local government itself and local governments from different regions. The research shows that such behaviors do help to enhance the effectiveness of local governments’ efforts to control air pollution: the central government’s spot checks, the subsidies for local governments’ control cost,the increase of rewards and penalties for local governments and regional joint governance actions among them. The research results show that multi-dimensional governance, interactive monitoring, and interest compensation are of great significance for improving the effectiveness of local air pollution control.

关 键 词：空气污染 地方政府 治理 演化博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F224.52[经济管理—国民经济]