专用性投资与契约稳定性的再审视——基于外部选择的探讨  

A Review of Specific Investment and Contract Stability——Discussion based on outside option

作　　者：刘馨月[1] 周力[1] LIU Xinyue;ZHOU Li

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《农业技术经济》2019年第8期68-78,共11页Journal of Agrotechnical Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号:71573130);国家自然科学基金青年项目(编号:71203094);江苏省高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(编号:PAPD);南京农业大学“中国粮食安全研究中心”的资助

摘　　要：本文阐明了农户专用性投资引发"反套牢之谜"的发生机制,并从外部选择角度出发,揭示了农户因专用性投资被"套牢"转变为凭借专用性投资实现"反套牢"的发生条件,最后利用江苏省11市13家农业产业化龙头企业的335户规模化契约养鸡户的调查数据进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,随着外部选择的增加,农户由因专用性投资被套牢转变为凭借专用性投资实现反套牢,当外部选择并非提供"公司+农户"契约的竞争性企业时,专用性投资对农户违约行为影响由负到正的转变还依赖于农户经验。This paper firstly illustrates the theoretical basis of how farmers ’ specific investment triggers "riddle of hold-up",and then reveals the mechanism of the status exchange between farmers and company from the perspectives of outside option. Finally,this paper uses the data of 335 contracted chicken households in Jiangsu Province. The results show that specific assets have a positive effect on defaults when there are multiple competitive enterprises. If there is only one company,the effects of specific investment on farmers defaults will change from negative to positive with the development of market transactions and the accumulation of farmers’ experience.

关 键 词：专用性投资 反套牢 外部选择 隐性违约 

分 类 号：F326.3[经济管理—产业经济] F324