独立董事惩戒的信号功能和处罚效果——基于2004—2014年证监会行政处罚的经验证据  

Signal Function and Effectiveness of Independent Director Sanctions: Evidence from the CSRC Sanctions in 2004—2014

作　　者：黄芳[1,2] HUANG Fang(School of International Audit,Nanjing University of Audit,Nanjing 210093,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学国际审计学院 [2]南京大学商学院

出　　处：《江苏经贸职业技术学院学报》2019年第4期11-17,共7页Journal of Jiangsu Institute of Commerce

基　　金：江苏高校品牌建设工程一期项目审计学专业(PPZY2015A077);江苏省高校哲学社会科学一般项目“基于供应链业务整合视角的舞弊审计研究”(2016SJD630017)

摘　　要：本文以2004—2014年因财务报告虚假而被证监会处罚的独立董事所兼职上市公司为对象,分别以修正的Jones模型和修正的DD模型估计的异常应计绝对值作为盈余质量的衡量指标,考察证监会对独立董事的行政处罚是否具有信号功能和威慑作用。研究发现:在受处罚前,独立董事所兼职公司的异常应计显著高于其他公司,说明处罚具有信号功能;在处罚后,独立董事所兼职公司的异常应计较处罚前有所下降,但不显著;而在处罚后改聘未受罚独立董事的公司的异常应计显著低于处罚前,说明处罚对其他独立董事具有一定的威慑和教育作用。We use discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model and modified DD model to surrogate earning quality and investigate the effect of independent director sanctions on earning quality by examining the data of concurrently in-service listed companies of the independent directors sanctioned by CSRC in 2004-2014. The result shows that before sanctions, discretionary accruals of the listed companies that the sanctioned independent directors were in service were significantly higher than those of other companies . Such result demonstrates the appropriateness of the sanction, and that the CSRC sanction can signal the independent director s poor supervision. After the sanctions, the sanctioned independent directors did not decrease the in-service companies discretionary accrual. But if the sanctioned independent directors were changed to the unsanctioned independent ones, the discretionary accruals would be significantly lower than before. The evidence to some extent supports the part effectiveness of the sanction.

关 键 词：独立董事 异常应计 行政处罚 信号功能 威慑作用 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]