智能机器外观形象的伦理问题——从拟人化到环境假设的道德图像  

The Moral Problems of Intelligent Machines’ Appearance:Transforming the Anthropomorphic Moral Self-Image to the Moral Image of the Environmental Hypothesis

作　　者：张正清 ZHANG Zhengqing(School of Marxism,Beihang University,Beijing,100191)

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2019年第10期24-30,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“‘后经验转向’时代的技术伦理规约机制及模式研究”（项目编号：13BZX024）

摘　　要：智能机器的外观设计存在拟人化倾向,拟人化设计背后是一种对自我的内在假设,认为智能机器想要合乎道德共同体的道德标准,就必须具有与共同体内部成员相似的道德图像。本文认为这种对道德图像的认识导致了一种自我谬误。这种错误理解会在个体层面导致道德身份同一的问题,在群体层面产生中心化的问题。而自我谬误反映到智能机器的道德自我上,表现为自我与他者混淆、绝对对象化和道德图像的不对称;反映到外观设计上就是内在假设的自我主导机器的道德图像。而环境假设的自我可以克服自我谬误带来的问题,其在设计上主张客体图像的独立性、它者行为的差异性和互动关系的去道德化,从而构建一种承认它者性道德的设计路径。The appearance design of intelligent machines has the trend to be more anthropomorphic than before,in order to produce more affinity for machines to be accepted by their users.The inherent hypothesis of self behind this anthropomorphism claims that only the moral image similar to that of the members of moral communities can secure the appropriate performance of a moral-self of machines.This paper considers this moral-self as a fallacy of self.It creates the problem of moral identity at the individual level,and the problem of centralization at the group level.For the hypothetical moral-self of intelligent machines,the fallacy of self causes the mixture of self and others,the absolute objectification,and the asymmetry of the moral image.For the design of appearance,the fallacy led to a moral image of machines dominated by the inherent hypothesis of self.The self of environmental hypotheses is a way to overcome the fallacy of self.In design,it proposes the independence of others’image,the dissimilarity of others’action and the de-moralization of interrelationships.Based on that,therefore,we can establish a design approach that admits the morality of otherness.

关 键 词：智能机器 道德图像 设计伦理 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]