TWINE算法的相关密钥不可能飞来去器攻击  

Related-key impossible boomerang cryptanalysis on TWINE

作　　者：谢敏[1] 田峰 李嘉琪 XIE Min;TIAN Feng;LI Jiaqi(State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室

出　　处：《通信学报》2019年第9期184-192,共9页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家重点研发计划基金资助项目(No.2016YFB0800601);国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.U1636209);“十三五”国家密码发展基金资助项目(No.MMJJ20180219)~~

摘　　要：为了评估轻量级分组密码算法TWINE的安全性,利用相关密钥不可能飞来去器的方法对其进行了分析。构造了由16轮和17轮两条路径组成的相关密钥不可能飞来去器区分器,并将16轮和17轮的路径向前扩展4轮、向后分别扩展3轮和2轮,完成对23轮TWINE密码算法(80 bit密钥)的攻击。实验结果表明,该攻击的数据复杂度为262. 05个明文,时间复杂度为270.49次23轮加密,与现有算法相比有明显优势。In order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher TWINE, the method of related-key impossible boomerang cryptanalysis was applied and a related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher consisting of 16-round and 17-round paths was constructed. Based on this new distinguisher, an attack on 23-round TWINE was mounted successfully by concatenating 4-round to the beginning and 2-round for the 17-round path and 3-round for the 16-round path to the end respectively. The attack on 23-round TWINE required data complexity of only 262.05 plaintexts and computational complexity of about 270.49 23-round encryptions. Compared with published cryptanalysis results, the proposed attack has obvious advantages.

关 键 词：TWINE算法 轻量级分组密码 不可能飞来去器 相关密钥 

分 类 号：TN918.1[电子电信—通信与信息系统]