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作 者:李艳婷 张翠华[1] 李春雨[1] 吕茹霞 LI Yan-ting;ZHANG Cui-hua;LI Chun-yu;LYU Ru-xia(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)
机构地区:[1]东北大学工商管理学院
出 处:《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》2019年第10期1504-1509,共6页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371043,71771044)
摘 要:针对一个线上平台和一个线下服务商组成的供应链,考虑线上平台服务外包和线下服务商加盟的两种O2O模式,研究服务质量控制问题.构建两种模式下服务质量控制基本模型,分析服务价格弹性、服务质量成本系数、营销努力成本系数等对服务价格、服务质量和营销努力的影响.通过数值仿真分析集中和分散决策下的均衡解.研究结果表明:服务质量和营销努力水平与服务价格弹性负相关;线下服务商加盟模式中分散决策导致“双重边际化”效应;线上平台所获利润份额较小且进行分散决策时,线上平台选择服务外包模式,否则选择服务商加盟模式.In a supply chain consisting of an online platform and an offline service provider,the service quality control was studied by considering the two O2O modes of online platform service outsourcing mode and the offline service provider franchising mode.A basic model of service quality control under two modes was constructed,and the influences of service price elasticity,service quality cost coefficient,marketing effort cost coefficient on service price,service quality and marketing effort were analyzed.An equilibrium solution under centralized and decentralized decision was analyzed by numerical simulation.The results showed that service quality and marketing effort level are negatively correlated with service price elasticity.The decentralized decision-making in the offline service provider franchising mode leads to the effect of"double marginalization".When the profit distribution proportion obtained by the platform is small and the decentralized decision-making is made,the online platform chooses the service outsourcing mode or the service provider franchising mode.
关 键 词:O2O模式 服务外包 服务商加盟 质量控制 STACKELBERG博弈
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