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作 者:谢贞发[1] 朱恺容 李培 XIE Zhenfa;ZHU Kairong;LI Pei(School of Economics,Xiamen University;Xiamen Medical Security Bureau;School of Economics,Zhejiang University)
机构地区:[1]厦门大学经济学院财政系,361005 [2]厦门市医疗保障局,361000 [3]浙江大学经济学院,310027
出 处:《经济研究》2019年第10期57-73,共17页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA096);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71673229);福建省自然科学基金计划资助项目(2017J01134);北京大学-林肯研究院城市发展与土地政策研究中心论文奖学金项目的资助。
摘 要:本文将中国式分权下的两个核心制度——税收分成制度与土地制度——联系起来,基于财政激励视角,研究税收分成对地方政府城市土地配置行为的影响。文章从理论上分析了市县级政府面临的增值税分成、营业税分成变化对工业用地和商住用地配置产生的直接和交叉效应。利用1999—2011年间相匹配的市县级政府税收分成数据和地级市市辖区分类型土地使用数据,进行了实证检验。结果显示,增值税分成通过财政利益效应显著正向影响了工业用地的配置;营业税分成通过影响增值税的相对分成变化显著负向影响了工业用地的配置。财政利益效应和财政压力效应的相互抵消,使得营业税分成变化对商住用地的配置效应较弱;增值税分成上升通过工业溢出效应和财政压力转嫁效应促使地方政府增加了居住用地的配置。基于财政自给率、财政支出占GDP比重和产业结构的异质性检验结果与财政激励理论预期结论一致。最后,文章还发现,增值税分成上升降低了工业用地单位面积的产出效果,工业用地的集约利用仍是未来改革的重点。As the fundamental institutional arrangement of the fiscal decentralization system, the tax-sharing system has been in a state of evolution since its establishment in 1994. In addition, the sub-provincial tax-sharing systems have various characteristics. China's tax-sharing reform is not only related to the allocation of fiscal revenue among all levels of government but is also an important incentive mechanism for local governments. The Chinese land system has given city and county governments the monopoly of controlling urban land allocation and has become an important driving force for rapid industrialization and urbanization. The combination of the Chinese tax-sharing system and the land system has resulted in a “development patterns on the basis of land” and has affected the transition path of China's economic development and structural changes. We link the Chinese tax-sharing system with the land system and study the effect of the sharing of the value-added tax (VAT) and the business tax on the urban land allocation behavior of local governments from the perspective of fiscal incentives. Theoretically, the change in VAT sharing will change the fiscal interest of local governments in the allocation of industrial land, which in turn will affect the allocation of industrial land for local governments. The fiscal benefits of the allocation of commercial and residential land mainly consist of two parts: direct access to land transfer income and tax revenue, such as the business tax generated by the development and sale of the commercial services industry and the real estate industry. Compared with the first outcome, local governments' tax revenue from the business tax and other income from the allocation of commercial and residential land is small and the cycle is longer, mitigating the effect of changes to business tax sharing on commercial and residential land. Moreover, the drop in fiscal benefits and the increase in fiscal pressure caused by the reduction in the business tax share have the opposite effect
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