地方官员任期、晋升压力与经开区经济增长关系研究  

Research on the Relationships among the Tenure of Local Officials, Promotion Pressure and Economic Growth of Jinkai District

作　　者：张伟[1,2] 崔万田 ZHANG Wei;CUI Wan- tian(School of Economics, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110036;School of Economics, Inner Mongolia University of Finace and Economics, Hohhot 010051)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学经济学院,沈阳110036 [2]内蒙古财经大学经济学院,呼和浩特010051

出　　处：《软科学》2019年第10期126-130,138,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14BJL083)

摘　　要：以2010~2015年中国90个经开区数据为样本,研究了官员任期、晋升压力与经开区经济增长之间的关系,并得出如下结论:一是与省市主政官员的研究相似,经开区一把手官员任期较短、更替频繁,样本经开区官员平均任期2.56年,任期现象与晋升指挥棒下官员的晋升竞赛有关。二是官员任期与总量经济指标正相关,与经济增长率负相关,晋升压力与经济增长率存在正向促进作用。一方面从官员治理的角度验证了经开区经济高速增长的原因;另一方面也暗含这种晋升竞赛将影响官员任期,助推官员的短视行为,不利于提高经济发展的质量。Based on the data of 90 JinKai Districts in China from 2010 to 2015, this paper studies the relationship among the term of office, promotion pressure and economic growth of JinKai Districts. Results show that, firstly, similar to the research of provincial and municipal government officials, the term of office of top officials in JinKai Districts is short and frequently replaced. The average term of office of sample officials in JinKai Districts is 2.56 years. Competition is concerned. Second, the term of office of officials is positively correlated with the total economic indicators and negatively correlated with the economic growth rate. Promotion pressure has a positive role in promoting the economic growth rate. On the one hand, from the perspective of official governance, it verifies the reasons for the high-speed economic growth in the JinKai District;on the other hand, it implies that this promotion competition will affect the term of office of officials, promote the short-sighted behavior of officials, and is not conducive to improving the quality of economic development.

关 键 词：官员任期 晋升压力 经开区经济增长 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济] F202