如何破解联保贷款中的“搭便车”问题——基于博弈模型的分析  

How to Solve the "Free Rider" Problem in Group Lending:a Game-Theoretical Model

作　　者：戴菊贵[1,2] 金莉莉 DAI Jugui;JIN Lili

机构地区：[1]温州大学商学院金融工程系 [2]浙江大学经济学院博士后流动站 [3]温州大学商学院

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2019年第7期100-114,共15页Financial Regulation Research

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金面上项目“基于银行竞争的中小企业联保贷款问题研究(LY15G030024)”;中国博士后科学基金面上项目“基于社会网络的民营企业连环担保圈问题研究(2017M611966)”

摘　　要：已有研究认为,联保贷款可以减轻信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题,从而提高借款企业的努力水平,并有助于降低贷款利率。本文基于博弈模型的分析表明,在银行目标不变的条件下,虽然联保贷款可以降低贷款利率,但由于联保贷款中的连带责任导致的“搭便车”问题,借款企业的努力水平反而下降了。尤其当放贷银行的目标从追求零利润转变为追求利润最大化之后,联保借款企业的努力水平会进一步下降,联保贷款利率也会上升。这也是引发联保贷款风险的重要原因之一。在政策应对上,本文研究表明,在联保贷款中引入再融资“差别机制”,有助于降低联保贷款的利率和提高企业的努力水平,从而解决联保贷款中的“搭便车”问题。In the literature,group lending is thought to be capable to alleviate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by information asymmetry,thereby improving the level of efforts of borrowing enterprise and helping to lower the lending interest.This paper constructs a game-theoretical model and argues that if the target of banks is the same,though group lending could reduce lending rates,the level of efforts of the borrowing firms are also reduced due to the free rider problems.The efforts level of group lending firms would be further reduced if the target of banks shifts from zero-profit to profit maximization,leading to an increase of lending rates.This paper proposes to introduce the"differentiating mechanism"into group lending,which could reduce lending rates and increase level of efforts of lending firms at the same time,thus solves the free rider problem.

关 键 词：联保贷款 贷款利率 信用风险 道德风险 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]