关于存在预设失效的语义学探究  

The Inquiries into the Semantics for the Failure of Existential Presupposition

作　　者：郭建萍[1] 周冲 Jianping Guo;Chong Zhou

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学社会学学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2019年第4期77-89,共13页Studies in Logic

基　　金：山西省高等学校哲学社科研究一般项目“戴维森与达米特知识论比较研究”（2017211）

摘　　要：存在预设在经典逻辑中有着重要的地位。存在预设失效了的逻辑系统就会成为一种自由逻辑系统,不得不面对空名与真值间隙问题。本文基于这些自由逻辑系统讨论了如何为存在预设失效提供一个合适的语义解释:首先通过语义预设的概念来定义存在预设、将真值间隙定义为二值原则失效,而后比较了为真值间隙赋值的不同方案,最终在虚构主义的立场上指出,超赋值语义学在把空名看作虚构对象名称的同时保留了逻辑真,是较为理想的语义解释。Existencial presupposition plays an important role in classicial logic. Those logicalsystems failing existential presupposition will be a kind of free logics, and have to dealwith the problems about empty terms and truth-value gaps. Based on these free logics,the paper discusses how to provide an appropriate semantic interpretation for the failureof existential presupposition. We first define the existential presupposition by the conceptof semantic presupposition, and see the truth-value gaps as the failure of principleof bivalence. Then, we compare different schemes assigning values to truth-value gapsand point out that, from the standpoint of fictionalism, the supervaluation could be consideredas a desirable semantic interpretation, since it not only regards empty terms asthe names of fictional objects, but also preserves the logical truth.

关 键 词：存在预设 真值间隙 自由逻辑 超赋值 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]