财政分权、地方政府赶超行为与环境治理效率——基于87个城市数据的门槛效应及传导机制分析  

Fiscal Decentralization, Local Government Catch-Up Behavior and Environmental Governance Efficiency——Analysis of Threshold Effect and Transmission Mechanism Based on 87 Urban Data

作　　者：汤旖璆 施洁[1] TANG Yi-qiu;SHI Jie(Institute of Finance and Economics,Strategies,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences·Guizhou Academy of Social Sciences,Guiyang Guizhou,550001 China;School of Economics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang Guizhou 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院财经战略研究院·贵州省社会科学院,贵州贵阳550001 [2]贵州财经大学经济学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2019年第5期25-34,共10页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：利用2003—2016年全国87个重点城市的数据,通过DEA-Tobit、面板门槛回归等方法,深入探究财政分权、地方政府赶超行为以及环境治理效率三者关系,结果显示:地方政府赶超行为对不同经济发展水平的城市影响不同:三、四线等经济欠发达城市群的地方政府赶超行为能够为环境治理效率的提升带来正向影响,但一线及新一线等经济发达城市群地方政府的赶超行为却不利于环境治理效率的提升。财政分权对环境治理效率的非线性影响主要分布于行政级别较低、经济发展落后区域。上述区域的财政分权只有达到或者超过门槛值时,地方政府赶超行为才会对环境治理效率产生促进作用。Based on the data of 87 key cities in China from 2003 to 2016,the relationships among fiscal decentralization,local government catching-up and environmental governance efficiency are deeply explored through DEA-Tobit and panel threshold regression methods.The results show that local government catching-up and Catching-up have different impacts on cities with different levels of economic development.The non-linear impact of decentralization on the efficiency of environmental governance is mainly distributed in regions with low administrative level and backward economic development.Only when fiscal decentralization reaches or exceeds the threshold,can local governments catch up with and surpass the environmental governance efficiency.

关 键 词：财政分权 地方政府赶超行为 环境治理效率 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]