住房租赁市场监管的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of housing rental market supervision

作　　者：余孝军 何南昆 YU Xiaojun;HE Nankun(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学数统学院

出　　处：《邵阳学院学报（自然科学版）》2019年第4期1-8,共8页Journal of Shaoyang University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71761005)

摘　　要：针对住房租赁市场监管问题进行了进化博弈分析。首先,构建了房东群体间及房东和住房租赁监管部门间的进化博弈模型。其次,通过对不同博弈模型复制动态方程和进化稳定策略的分析,得到影响房东及住房租赁监管部门策略选择的因素。最后,给出规范住房租赁市场的建议。研究表明,博弈方的进化稳定策略与其收益、初始状态、监管力度、处罚力度、监管成本等因素相关。The housing rental market supervision problem was formulated by using the evolutionary game theory.Firstly,an evolutionary game model among landlords and the other model between a landlord and a housing rental supervision department were set up,respectively.Secondly,the influence factors of the landlord and the housing rental supervision department was obtained by analyzing the replication dynamic equation and the evolutionary stable strategy of those games.Finally,some reasonable advice was proposed to standardizing the housing rental market.It is shown that the evolutionary stable strategy of the landlord and the housing rental supervision department depend on the payoff of each player,initial state of the system,supervision,punishment and cost of supervision.

关 键 词：住房租赁市场 监管 进化博弈理论 进化稳定策略 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]