高阶表征理论的论证策略及其问题  

The Strategy of Higher-Order Representation and Its Problems

作　　者：柳海涛[1] LIU Hai-tao(School of Marxism,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学马克思主义学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2019年第10期3-8,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“当代心灵哲学视阈下的人工智能研究”(18BZX036);国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA029)。

摘　　要：高阶表征理论认为一个有意识的心理状态需要被另一个高阶心理表征。简单性论证和现象学论证是它的两个主要论证,它们的策略是先把意识看作高阶心理对低阶心理的觉知,然后用表征来定义觉知,最后把意识状态解释为高阶心理以低阶心理为表征对象的再表征。简单性论证的问题是没有进一步澄清表征的过程,现象学论证则没有充分说明自我表征命题如何从经验判断过渡到必然性判断。高阶表征对意识解释的实质是把意识状态看作不同心理状态之间的表征关系,但对其中的表征机制这一核心问题缺乏详尽的诠释。The theory of higher-order representation holds that a conscious mental state needs to be represented by another mental state.Simple argument and phenomenological argument are its two main arguments.Their strategy is:first,count consciousness as the awareness,then define awareness by representation,and finally interpret conscious as the re-representation of higher-order representation.The problem about simple argument is that the process of representation hasn’t been further clarified,while the phenomenological argument has not fully explained how the self-representation becomes one necessary judgment.The essence of higher-order representation to consciousness interpretation is to regard the state of conscious as the representational relationship between different mental states,but there is no detailed interpretation about the mechanism of representation,which is the core problem of higher-order representation.

关 键 词：高阶表征 意识 简单性论证 现象学论证 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]