演化博弈视角下大学生助学贷款诚信模型研究  

Study on the Honesty Model of University SSttuuddeenn tt Loan from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：金雪 Jin Xue(Nanjing University of Finance&Economics Hongshan College,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210000,China)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学红山学院

出　　处：《伊犁师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2019年第3期17-20,共4页Journal of Yili Normal University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：2018年江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金“基于演化博弈分析的诚信机制问题研究”(2018SJA2149)

摘　　要：研究在大学生助学贷款诚信机制中一些要素对主体行为的影响,借助演化博弈论,建构大学生助学贷款的诚信模型,指出提高大学生的诚信度以及增加大学生的失信成本是打破单轮博弈中银行与大学生之间的“恶性”均衡,实现帕累托最优均衡的关键.This paper studies the influence of some factors on the principal behavior in the honesty mechanism of university student loan.Using evolutionary game theory,to construct the loan integrity model of the bank and college students,it points out that the key to break the“vicious”balance between Banks and college students and achieving Pareto optimal equilibrium is to improve the credibility of college students and increase the cost of college students’loss of trust.

关 键 词：帕累托最优 复制动态方程 助学贷款 诚信机制 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.32[理学—数学]