国际工程竞标中的伯川德价格博弈研究  

Research on bertrand price competition in international project bidding

作　　者：董少劼 DONG Shao-jie(Norinco International Cooperation Ltd., Beijing 100040, China)

机构地区：[1]北方国际合作股份有限公司

出　　处：《黑龙江科学》2019年第20期154-155,共2页Heilongjiang Science

摘　　要：在我国对外承包工程业务规模不断扩大的大背景下,中国对外承包企业竞相采用低价竞标。运用博弈论的方法探讨在国际工程竞争中,中国承包商选择低价竞标策略的成因及后果。在伯川德博弈模型理论基础上,通过分析证明了国际工程中的低价竞标行为是各方伯川德价格博弈的结果,是企业间博弈中的一种策略性行为。Chinese international contractors compete for low price bidding under the background of the continuous expansion of the business scale of China’s international projects. This paper uses the method of game theory to explore the causes and consequences of Chinese contractors’ low price bidding strategy in the international project competitions. On the basis of Bertrand game model theory, it is proved that the low price bidding behavior in international projects is the result of Bertrand price competition, and it is a strategic behavior in the game between enterprises.

关 键 词：国际工程 低价竞标 伯川德价格博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]