政府补贴、企业创新和社会福利  

Government Subsidy, Firm Innovation, and Social Welfare

作　　者：夏晶[1] 范丽君[2] XIA Jing;FAN Li-jun(Department of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093;School of Management,Harbin Normal University,Harbin 150025)

机构地区：[1]南京大学管理科学与工程系,南京210093 [2]哈尔滨师范大学管理学院,哈尔滨150025

出　　处：《软科学》2019年第11期41-46,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71671085)

摘　　要：考虑政府的最优补贴策略及其对企业、消费者和社会的影响问题。纳入政府、创新企业和异质性消费者三个主体,构建政府分别补贴给企业和消费者以及无政补贴时的博弈模型并分析均衡结果。研究表明:当创新产品生产成本处于较低或者中等水平时政府才应当实施补贴,否则不要补贴,并且创新产品生产成本越低,最优补贴额度越高。政府补贴给企业或者消费者时,等效地扩大了创新产品的需求,改善了企业收益、消费者剩余和社会福利。并且,当企业面对异质性消费者时,政府补贴对企业的新产品创新起到积极影响。This paper examines the government’s optimal subsidy strategy and its impact on business, consumers and society. It considers a setting with three subjects, i.e., the government, the firm, and the heterogeneous consumers. Then, the model in the case where the government subsidies the firm/consumers and the case without subsidy is, respectively, developed by consumers choice theory and game theory. An analysis of the equilibrium outcomes reveals that the government should take the differences of innovative products into consideration before making subsidy decisions. Specifically, only when the production cost of innovative product is low or at a middle level will the government subsidizes. Moreover, the demand for innovative product, the firm’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare can be identically increased when the government subsidies the firm or the consumers. Numerical examples demonstrate that the government subsidy promotes the firm’s innovational level of new product when it faces heterogeneous consumers.

关 键 词：政府补贴 新产品创新 产品定价 消费者剩余 社会福利 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F273.1