财政补贴、寻租成本与新能源企业经营绩效  

Financial Subsidies, Rent-seeking Costs and Operating Performance of New Energy Companies

作　　者：俞金红[1] 于明超[2] YU Jin-hong;YU Ming-chao(School of Economics,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093;School of Business,Nanjing Normal University Nanjing 210046)

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,南京210093 [2]南京师范大学商学院,南京210046

出　　处：《软科学》2019年第11期59-63,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172041);江苏省社会科学基金基地项目(15JD021)

摘　　要：利用2009~2016年中国A股市场新能源概念类上市公司数据,构建中介效应模型,探索财政补贴、企业寻租以及经营绩效间的关系。研究结果表明:财政补贴不能促进以盈利能力衡量的企业绩效,财政补贴强度每增加1%,会使总资产收益率降低0.79%、净资产收益率降低1.33%;同时,财政补贴吸引企业进行寻租行为,耗费寻租成本带来进一步的扭曲,寻租对企业绩效的中介效应约占总效应的三分之一。Based on the data from 2009 to 2016 of China’s A-share market new energy concept listed companies, the paper constructs a mediation effect model and explores the relationship among financial subsidies, corporate rent-seeking, and business performance. Results show that government financial subsidies have not promoted the performance improvement of new energy enterprises. Moreover, government subsidies attract enterprises to rent-seeking behaviors, which cost rent-seeking costs and bring further distortions. Each 1% increase in subsidy intensity will reduce return on assets(ROA) by 0.79% and return on equity(ROE) by 1.33%, and the mediating effect of rent-seeking is about 1/3.

关 键 词：财政补贴 寻租 新能源 经营绩效 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F273