1954年台湾海峡危机与美国中央情报局的情报评估  

Cross-Strait Crisis in 1954 and CIA Intelligence Estimate

作　　者：吴浩[1] 吴昊 Wu Hao;Wu Hao(College of Liberal Arts,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444)

机构地区：[1]上海大学文学院

出　　处：《军事历史研究》2019年第2期30-42,共13页Military History Research

基　　金：2019年上海市教委高原学科项目“上海大学世界史”;2019年上海高水平地方高校创新团队项目

摘　　要：1954年台湾海峡危机爆发前后,美国中央情报局对中共的战略意图、军事力量以及台湾海峡局势进行了一系列的评估。这些情报评估对中共的战略意图形成了清晰的认识,并且对中共解放浙东沿海岛屿的作战方案做出了比较正确的预判。同时,这些评估对危机缓和时期中共针对台湾的政策与方针也做出了个别误判。总体而言,中央情报局对中共的情报评估基本是准确的,从整体上把握了中共对台湾及东南沿海岛屿的军事方针和意图,从而为艾森豪威尔政府在危机期间做出相关决策提供了重要的情报支撑。Before and during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954,the US Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) conducted a series of estimates on the strategic intentions and military power of the Communist Party of China,as well as the situation in the Taiwan Strait. These analyses and estimations formed a rather clear picture of CPC’s strategic intentions and made a relatively correct pre-judgment of CPC’s plan for the liberation of the offshore islands in eastern Zhejiang Province. However,there were also a few miscalculations in these intelligence estimates on CPC’s Taiwan policies and guidelines in the crisis detente period. Generally speaking,CIA’s intelligence estimates were basically accurate concerning the Communist Party of China before and during the 1954 Cross-Strait Crisis and it grasped its overall military policy and intentions about Taiwan and the southeastern offshore islands,thus providing important information support for the Eisenhower administration to make relevant decisions during the crisis.

关 键 词：美国中央情报局 1954年台海危机 中国共产党 情报评估 艾森豪威尔 

分 类 号：K27[历史地理—历史学] E29[历史地理—中国史]