溢出效应影响下低碳减排策略的演化博弈分析——基于系统动力学  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies Under the Influence of Spillover Effect Based on System Dynamics

作　　者：林敏[1] 刘虹[1] LIN Min;LIU Hong(Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108 China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2019年第6期56-68,共13页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：从溢出效应视角出发研究供应链上下游企业间的碳减排投入策略问题,利用演化博弈模型和系统动力学模型,探究在低碳经济背景下供应链各利益主体对于碳减排投入的策略选择和演化稳定路径。研究结果表明:上下游企业投入碳减排决策的稳定状态主要与减排投入成本和收益、"搭便车"行为所支付的补偿成本和所获得的额外收益等因素密切相关。研究者还进一步探讨了在政府调控下基于奖惩机制的演化过程,分析奖惩金额与比例对演化稳定策略的影响。最后利用系统动力学软件仿真分析验证了演化模型的有效性。From the perspective of spillover effect, this paper studies the carbon emission reduction investment strategy between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, and uses the evolutionary game model and the system dynamics model to explore the strategic choices of various stakeholders in the supply chain for carbon emission reduction in the context of low carbon economy and a stable path to evolution. The results show that the steady state of upstream and downstream enterprises’ decision to invest in carbon emission reduction is closely related to factors such as the cost and benefits of emission reduction, the compensation cost of"free-riding" behavior and the additional benefits obtained. The researchers further explored the evolution process based on the reward and punishment mechanism under government regulation, and analyzed the impact of the amount and proportion of rewards and punishments on the evolutionary stability strategy. Finally, the effectiveness of the evolution model is verified by the simulation analysis of system dynamics software.

关 键 词：溢出效应 低碳减排 演化博弈 系统动力学 奖惩机制 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]