“双积分”制度下新能源汽车双合作制造的博弈分析  

New Energy Vehicle Co-production Analysis under Double Integration System Based on Game Theory

作　　者：于晓辉 刘玉博 邹正兴[2] 陈雯 YU Xiaohui;LIU Yubo;ZOU Zhengxing;CHEN Wen(School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China;School of Management&Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;School of Petro China Marketing Company,Beijing 100007,China)

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [3]中国石油销售公司,北京100007

出　　处：《经济数学》2019年第4期46-52,共7页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(71801016,71772016);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目资(17YJC630203);北京市教育委员会社会科学计划一般项目(SM201910037007);北京市属高校长城学者培养计划项目(CIT&TCD20190320)

摘　　要：基于即将实施的“双积分”政策,分析普通、新能源汽车生产线共存的供应链合作模式,建立“双积分”下新能源汽车双合作制造模型,提出车企总收益最大化的生产布局策略.分析分配应该满足的性质,将满足此性质的双合作博弈Shapley值应用到两条生产线并存的供应链合作制造问题中,提出最优分配策略.最后,以吉利汽车为例进行实证分析,对于总积分值为正的单位,应该通过增加普通汽车产量、对外出售积分、提高积分达标值等增加收益.实证显示新能源汽车双合作制造模型的有效性,模拟结果可为车企决策提供参考.The double integration policy is analyzed.Through the analysis of the cooperation model in supply chain between the common automobile and the new energy automobile,the dual cooperation model between the car enterprises and its suppliers is established.The production adjustment strategies are proposed to improve the total income.The properties that reasonable allocation strategies should satisfy are proposed and analyzed.Profit distribution strategy of manufacturing cooperation is given based on bi-cooperative game’s Shapley value.Finally,an empirical analysis of Greely Auto Group is made.The results show that manufacturing cooperation,whose total scores are positive,should increase the output of common automobiles,sell scores and improve fuel integral standard to increase the value of each partner's income distribution.The empirical results show the validity of our model,and can be seen as a decision-making for car enterprises.

关 键 词：双积分 新能源汽车 双合作博弈 

分 类 号：N945.25[自然科学总论—系统科学]