惯习性社会事实作为法律效力来源的局限性  

The Limitation of Conventional Social Facts as a Source of Legal Validity

作　　者：王静 WANG Jing(Law School,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210046 China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学法学院

出　　处：《河北法学》2019年第11期166-177,共12页Hebei Law Science

基　　金：教育部基金项目《美国女性主义法学方法论研究》(15YJA820028)阶段性研究成果之一

摘　　要：惯习命题主张法律的有效性完全依赖于惯习承认的社会事实。但在法律来源上,惯习性社会事实并不能穷尽法律命题。惯习作为行为与态度的聚合,在最初选择哪些惯习成为法律命题时,已有拒绝异议的局限性。基于社会惯习所产生的法律命题只能解决经验争议却不能解决理论争议。为满足合法性价值标准,惯习命题选择的抽象策略与实证主义的主张牵强附和。包容性实证主义误以为道德之所以能成为法律效力的判准是因为存在吸纳了道德的惯习性事实,事实上,影响法官判案的道德因素大多是协同性道德。因此,惯习命题在法律效力的判准上存在无法克服的局限性。法律效力的来源一定是价值而非事实。The conventional proposition asserts that the validity of law depends entirely on the legal source of conventional recognition.In terms of the source of law,convention is the aggregation of behavior and attitude,which has rejected dissent in the initial selection of legal propositions.Legal propositions based on conventional social fact can only solve empirical disputes but not theoretical disputes.In order to fit the value standard of legality,the abstract strategy of conventional proposition and positivism are far-fetched.Inclusive positivism mistakenly believes that the reason why morality can become the criterion of legal validity is the fact that there is a convention that absorbs morality.In fact,most of the moral factors that affect judges’judgment are concurrent morality.Therefore,conventional proposition has some insuperable limitations in determining the legal validity.The source of legal validity must be value,not fact.

关 键 词：法律效力 惯习性社会事实 法律命题 法律根据 合法性 

分 类 号：DF03[政治法律—法学理论]