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作 者:郑蔚[1] 陈越 郑晓辉 ZHENG Wei;CHEN Yue;ZHENG Xiaohui(School of Economics,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350007,China)
机构地区:[1]福建师范大学经济学院
出 处:《地域研究与开发》2019年第6期29-33,67,共6页Areal Research and Development
基 金:福建省自然科学基金面上项目(2017J01656);福建省社会科学规划重点项目(FJ2018MGCA035);国家自然科学基金青年项目(41301131);2018年全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心(福建师范大学)课题项目(Y201802);福建省教育厅高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划
摘 要:经济体制改革过程需要地方政府正确调整角色定位、明确工作职责。以福建为例,区分各类地方政府竞争行为对区域经济协调发展的影响,测算地方政府竞争行为的安全边界,并寻求合理可行的风险管控措施。结果表明:地方产业保护、吸引外资优惠政策竞争以及固定资产投资竞争等3种竞争行为对区域经济协调发展的影响均呈现“倒U”关系,地方政府竞争的经济和政治激励略有“走偏”倾向。需通过完善政绩考核机制、加强法律规范等方式限定地方政府竞争行为边界,并通过建立区域经济协调机构和对落后地区进行政策倾斜等进行风险管控。In the process of economic restructuring,local governments need to correctly adjust their role position,clarify the functions and responsibilities.This paper took Fujian Province for example to distinguish the influences of various local government competition behaviors in regional economic coordinated development,calculated the safety boundary of different local government competition behaviors,explored the reasonable and feasible strategies to control the risks.The results showed that three kinds of competitions such as local industrial protection policy,preferential policies aimed at attracting FDI and investment in the fixed assets all showed an“inverted U”relationship and the economic and political incentives of local government competition had a slight“deviation”tendency.It is important to limit the competition behavior boundary by improving government performance evaluation mechanism and strengthening laws and regulations to local governments.It is necessary to establish a regional coordination institution and carry out preferential policies for backward areas to control risks.
关 键 词:地方政府竞争 行为边界 风险管控 经济协调 福建省
分 类 号:F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]
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