考虑风险态度的多属性逆向拍卖模型及机制设计  

Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Model and Mechanism Design Under the Consideration of the Risk Attitude

作　　者：陈德艳 汪定伟[1] CHEN De-yan;WANG Ding-wei(School of Information Science & Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110819,China;College of Science,Liaoning Shihua University,Fushun 113001,China.)

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院,辽宁沈阳110819 [2]辽宁石油化工大学理学院,辽宁抚顺113001

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2019年第12期1685-1689,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502029)

摘　　要：针对多属性逆向拍卖中买家得分函数和属性权重难以确定的问题,考虑到买家风险态度的影响,提出一个兼顾模糊投入产出效率和供应商能力的赢者决定模型,并设计一个两阶段的拍卖机制.买家在拍卖第一阶段提取有效投标信息并剔除差的卖家,在第二阶段优化各属性投标值并确定赢者.数例分析结果验证了模型的有效性.在不揭露买家信息的情况下,两阶段拍卖机制保证了买家的利益;随着买家风险爱好程度的增加,卖家综合效率得分也随之增高,不同的风险态度会导致拍卖双方策略和拍卖结果的改变.To solve the difficulty of identifying score function and attribute weight,a winner decision model including the fuzzy input-output efficiency and supplier capability was proposed,as well as a two-stage auction mechanism.The effective bidding information could be extracted and the inferior sellers could be eliminated by the buyer in the first stage of the auction.In the second stage,the bidding value of attributes could be optimized and the final winner could be determined.The result of numerical example verified the validity of the model.The two-stage auction mechanism ensures the interests of buyer without the information disclosure.With the increase of buyers′risk preference,the comprehensive efficiency score of sellers increases.Different risk attitudes will lead to the change of auction strategies of both parties and the difference of auction result.

关 键 词：多属性逆向拍卖 风险态度 赢者决定 拍卖机制 综合效率 

分 类 号：TP224.32[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]