我国农地不平等的演进:事实和动力——基于全国代表性农户调查数据的初步结果  

The Evolution of Farmland Inequality in China: Facts and Mechanisms:An Empirical Study Based on Nationally Representative Survey Data

作　　者：张同龙 张林秀[2] ZHANG Tonglong;HUANG Xiaowen;ZHANG Linxiu

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学国家农业制度与发展研究院,广州510642 [2]中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所农业政策研究中心,北京100101

出　　处：《农业经济问题》2019年第11期15-24,共10页Issues in Agricultural Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71110107028/71742003和71333012);国家社科基金项目(编号:17BJL009);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(编号:16YJA790065)

摘　　要：农地制度设计同时要考虑平等和效率维度,而对于其平等维度的实证研究很少。本文使用了中国科学院农业政策研究中心的微观调查数据,分别估算了1996-2013年农地承包权和经营权不平等的(基尼)系数,并探讨了不平等动态演化背后的动力机制。研究表明:(1)无论是承包权还是经营权,不平等状况一直呈缓慢扩大趋势,其中经营权在2006年后有加速集中的趋势。(2)对于承包权不平等的扩大,二轮承包以来农地调整几乎被禁止是最重要的制度因素。另外,日趋频繁的农地征占也加剧了承包权不平等。(3)对于经营权不平等的扩大,基于市场动机的农地流转确实在起作用,只是其程度仍需彰显。村庄集体流转能显著促进经营权集中。承包权分布对于经营权具有"压舱石"的作用,其禀赋分配的影响在短期弹性为0.7,18年的长期弹性仍有0.3。(4)从长期看,经营权集中仍受限于承包权禀赋分配,而较少受到其经济因素的影响,其演进是长期渐变的。(5)基于实证研究结果,本文认为实现"三权分置"的关键是分离土地的社会保障功能,通过提高新农保的保障水平可以弱化承包权不平等扩大的影响,同时加快经营权的集中。Using nationally representative microeconomic survey data from China, we estimate the Gini coefficients of farmland inequality from 1996 to 2013, from the perspectives of both contract and usage rights. We also examine the dynamic mechanisms behind the evolution of inequality. Our results show that the inequality of farmland distribution has experienced a gradual expansion for both contract and usage rights over the past two decades, and that it accelerated for the latter following 2006. As for the expansion of inequality in contracting rights, the most important institutional reason behind it is that farmland reallocation was nearly banned in the second round of land contracting. Moreover, increasingly frequent farmland seizures contributed to this expansion. As for the expansion of usage rights inequality, individual transfers based on market motivations do play an important role, but not to the extent expected. Collective transfers organized by villages also significantly promote the centralization of usage rights. Therefore, the distribution of contract rights plays a leading role in the distribution of usage rights: the short-term elasticity is 0.7, while the long-term elasticity over 18 years is still 0.3. Thus, in the long run, the centralization of usage rights is still limited to the distribution of contract rights, while remaining less affected by other economic factors. This results in a long and gradual evolution.

关 键 词：二轮承包 三权分置 承包权固化 经营权集中 

分 类 号：F32[经济管理—产业经济]