剩余控制权视域下的运动式执法——法律经济学的视角  

Campaign-style Law Enforcement from the Perspective of Residual Control Rights: Investigation From Legal Economics

作　　者：阳李 YANG Li(School of Law,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学法学院

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2019年第6期100-112,共13页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BFX134)

摘　　要：运动式执法已经成为行政执法领域中不可忽视的治理利器。不同学科从不同路径和方法切入得到大相径庭的研究结论。大体而言,学界对运动式执法的评价历经"早期完全否定-逐步理性认知-当下有限肯定"三个不同阶段。以委托-代理、剩余控制权和理性预期为理论前提,通过构建行政执法机关、地方政府以及社会收益的理论模型,逻辑解读运动式执法,认为运动式执法实质是地方政府与行政执法机关因不同情势而产生的剩余控制权之相机分配,并通过现实案例予以检验。在满足特定条件时,运动式执法可能实现"制度化走向"。Campaign-style law enforcement has become a weapon of governance that cannot be ignored in the field of administrative law enforcement. Different disciplines have drawn different research conclusions from different approaches and methods.Generally speaking, the evaluation of campaign-style law enforcement in the academic circles has gone through three different stages: early complete denial, gradual rational understanding and limited affirmation at present. Based on the principal premise of principal-agent, residual control and rational expectation, this paper proposes a model of campaign-style law enforcement by constructing an economic model of administrative law enforcement agencies, local governments and social benefits, making a rational interpretation of campaign-style law enforcement. It is argued that the essence of campaign-style law enforcement is the contingent distribution of residual control rights between local governments and administrative law enforcement agencies due to different situations, which is tested by real cases, and it may achieve the "institutionalization" when the specific conditions in law are met.

关 键 词：运动式执法 常规式执法 委托代理理论 剩余控制权 制度化走向 法律经济学 

分 类 号：DF0-059[政治法律—法学理论] D922[政治法律—法学]