Attack and Defense Strategies in Complex Networks Based on Game Theory  

作　　者：LI Yapeng DENG Ye XIAO Yu WU Jun 

机构地区：[1]College of Systems Engineering,National University of Defense Technology,Changsha 410073,China [2]International Academic Center of Complex Systems,Beijing Normal University,Zhuhai 519087,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2019年第6期1630-1640,共11页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71871217 and 71371185;the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province under Grant No.2019JJ20019

摘　　要：To investigate the attack and defense strategies in complex net works,the authors propose a two-player zero-sum static game model with complete information which considers attack and defense strategies simultaneously.The authors assume that both the attacker and defender have two typical strategies:Targeted strategy and random strategy.The authors explore the Nash equilibriums of the attacker-defender game and demonstrate that when the attacker's attack resources are not so significantly abundant as the defender's resources,there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in both model net works and real-world net works,in which the defender protects the hub t arge ts with large degrees preferentially,while the attacker prefers selecting the targets randomly.When the attack resources are much higher than defense resources,both the attacker and the defender adopt the targeted strategy in equilibriums.This paper provides a new theoretical framework for the study of attack and defense st rat egies in complex net works.To investigate the attack and defense strategies in complex networks, the authors propose a two-player zero-sum static game model with complete information which considers attack and defense strategies simultaneously. The authors assume that both the attacker and defender have two typical strategies: Targeted strategy and random strategy. The authors explore the Nash equilibriums of the attacker-defender game and demonstrate that when the attacker’s attack resources are not so significantly abundant as the defender’s resources, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in both model networks and real-world networks, in which the defender protects the hub targets with large degrees preferentially, while the attacker prefers selecting the targets randomly. When the attack resources are much higher than defense resources, both the attacker and the defender adopt the targeted strategy in equilibriums. This paper provides a new theoretical framework for the study of attack and defense strategies in complex networks.

关 键 词：Attack and defense strategies attacker-defender game complex net works Nash equilibriums 

分 类 号：TP3[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]