分时电价下基于供用电双方博弈的家庭用户需求响应  

Demand Response of Household Users Based on Game between Power Supply and Consumption Side under Time-of-Use Price

作　　者：陆青 郁浩 赵康丽 冷亚军 LU Qing;YU Hao;ZHAO Kangli;LENG Yajun(College of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200090,China;State Grid Jining Electric Power Supply Company,Jining 272000,China)

机构地区：[1]上海电力大学经济与管理学院,上海200090 [2]国网济宁市供电公司,山东济宁272000

出　　处：《现代电力》2019年第6期68-74,共7页Modern Electric Power

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51507099,71601109);上海市教育委员会科研创新资助项目(14YS094)

摘　　要：动态电价策略正成为当前电力市场环境下供电侧普遍采用的调控手段,针对电力市场中售电公司与用户间互动关系,基于博弈论构建一种非合作的Stackelberg模型研究家庭用户的需求响应策略。模型通过对用户进行分类以实现对不同偏好用户的综合考虑,同时将电网负荷波动对售电公司效益的影响、用户满意度对用电舒适度的影响进行量化处理以完善供、用电双方效用函数。采用逆向归纳法对模型的纳什均衡解进行求解,并以此实现分时电价下对用户用电任务的优化调整。最后,将模型应用于实际算例中并对用户种类进行灵敏度分析,结果表明模型在供用电双方的效用优化方面具有较好的效果。The dynamic pricing strategy is becoming the generally used regulating means by supply side in the current electricity market.Considering the interactive relationship between retailers and users in the electricity market,a noncooperative Stackelberg model based on game theory is constructed to study the demand response strategy of household users.The model classifies users to achieve comprehensive consideration of users with different preferences.Meanwhile,the impact of load fluctuations on retailers’benefits and the effect of users’satisfaction on the comfort are quantified to improve the utility function on both power supply and consumption side.The backward induction is adopted to solve the Nash equilibrium of the model,and in this way the optimal adjustment of the electricity services under time-ofuse price can be realized.Finally,the model is applied to the practical example and the sensitivity of the user category is analyzed.The results show the proposed model has better effect on utility optimization between power supply and consumption side.

关 键 词：需求响应 用户满意度 STACKELBERG模型 分时电价 逆向归纳法 

分 类 号：TM76[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]