Ad hoc网络中一种基于转发联盟博弈框架的激励合作路由算法  

Incentive Cooperation Routing Algorithm Based on Forwarding Coalitional Game Framework for Ad hoc Networks

作　　者：王博[1] 王丽宏[1] 黄传河[2] WANG Bo;WANG Lihong;HUANG Chuanhe(National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center,Beijing 100029,China;School of Computer Science,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,Hubei,China)

机构地区：[1]国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心,北京100029 [2]武汉大学计算机学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（理学版）》2019年第6期527-537,共11页Journal of Wuhan University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家重点研发计划（2016QY03D0504,2016YFB0801304）;国家自然科学基金项目（61300206）

摘　　要：为增强Ad hoc网络中节点合作的积极性,借鉴联盟博弈理论,针对节点之间数据包转发过程,定义了转发联盟博弈(forwarding coalitional game,FCG),建立了FCG支付模型,给出了确保形成的大联盟为稳定核的约束条件,并基于经典的按需路由算法对上述模型进行了实现,提出了一种基于FCG框架的激励合作路由(incentive cooperation routing,ICR)算法,并且通过仿真实验对该算法进行了有效性验证。仿真结果表明,该算法在分组投递率、端到端的平均时延、路由开销、联盟支付分配和中间节点转发数据包数量等方面的性能提高显著,能够有效地激励自私节点合作转发的积极性。In order to enforce the enthusiasm of node cooperation in Ad hoc networks,in this paper,we define the packet forward⁃ing process between nodes as forwarding coalitional game(FCG)based on coalitional game theory,and establish the FCG pay⁃ment model.We analyze the constraint conditions for the resulting stable core of the grand coalition,implement the above model using the classic on-demand routing algorithm,and propose the incentive cooperation routing(ICR)algorithm based on forwarding coalitional game framework.Furthermore,we verify the effectiveness of this algorithm by simulation experiments.Simulation re⁃sults show that the performance of the proposed algorithm is improved significantly in term of packet delivery fraction,average end-to-end delay,routing overhead,coalitional payoff allocation and the number of packets forwarded by intermediate nodes,and it also can stimulate the cooperative forwarding initiative of selfish nodes.

关 键 词：联盟博弈 支付分配 稳定核 激励合作 路由算法 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]