基于效用理论的新能源汽车政府补贴研究  

Study on government subsidy for new energy vehicles based on utility theory

作　　者：陈玉城 施英[1] 翟颖龄 毛涵一 CHEN Yucheng;SHI Ying;ZHAI Yingling;MAO Hanyi(School of Sciences,Zhejiang University of Science and Technology,Hangzhou 310023,Zhejiang,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江科技学院理学院

出　　处：《浙江科技学院学报》2019年第6期511-516,共6页Journal of Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家级大学生创新创业训练计划项目(201811057019);国家自然科学基金项目(11501510)

摘　　要：近年来政府制定一系列补贴政策促进新能源汽车的推广,政府补贴成为新能源车企的主要激励途径。以促进企业良性发展且使政府补贴政策发挥最大效用为目的,先利用冯·纽曼-摩根斯坦效用函数理论与动态贝叶斯博弈理论,从博弈论角度分析政府与车企间的动态博弈,并建立基于效用理论的新能源汽车政府补贴模型。然后采用逆向归纳法对该效用模型进行求解,得出4种因素对政府补贴的影响。最后对补贴方案的适用性与可行性进行进一步解释,建议政府加强对新能源汽车企业的监督,使车企更好完善售后服务。In recent years,the government has formulated a series of subsidy policies to promote the development of new energy vehicles,and government subsidies have become the main incentive for new energy vehicle enterprises.In order to promote the healthy development of enterprises and make the best use of government subsidy policy to maximize its effectiveness,this paper analyzed the dynamic game between the government and the vehicle enterprises from the perspective of game theory by employing the von Neumann Morgenstein s utility function theory and the dynamic Bayesian game theory,and established a government subsidy model for new energy vehicles based on the utility theory.The utility model was solved by reverse induction,obtaining the influence of four factors on government subsidies.Finally,applicability and feasibility of the scheme were further clarified,and it is suggested that the government should strengthen supervision of new energy vehicle enterprises,so that they can better improve after-sales service.

关 键 词：博弈论 新能源汽车 效用理论 政府补贴 逆向归纳法 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]