基于主从博弈的单一电商物流服务供应链研究  

Research on Single E-commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Master-slave Game

作　　者：黄清娟[1] HUANG Qingjuan(Department of Business,Fuzhou Polytechnic,Fuzhou,Fujian 350108,China)

机构地区：[1]福州职业技术学院商学院

出　　处：《闽江学院学报》2019年第6期48-54,共7页Journal of Minjiang University

摘　　要：优化电子商务物流服务供应链是电子商务物流服务商与网络商店共同的目标。找出电子商务交易过程中物流供应链中影响利润收益的重要决策因素,有益于创建合理的利益分配。假设存在单一电子商务物流服务商,则其在决策顺序上就存在先手的时间优势,有较高的话语权与主导权。而网络商店依靠电子商务物流服务商的决策而采取行动,二者之间存在着主从博弈关系。研究表明,在单一电子商务物流服务商的情况下,电子商务物流服务商的利润具有优先权,其在物流成本支出上不受外界因素的限制,虽然能扩大并稳固自身的收益,但也失去了监控与制约。Optimizing the supply chain of e-commerce logistics service is a common goal for the development of e-commerce logistics service providers and online stores.Find out the important decision-making factors that affect profit and profit in the logistics supply chain in the process of e-commerce transactions,which is beneficial to create a reasonable distribution of benefits.Assuming that there is a single e-commerce logistics service provider,e-commerce logistics service providers have a first-hand time advantage in decision-making sequence,and have a higher voice and dominance.Online stores,on the other hand,rely on the decision-making of e-commerce logistics service providers to take action.There is a master-slave game relationship between them.The research shows that in the case of single e-commerce logistics service provider,the profit of e-commerce logistics service provider has priority,and its logistics cost expenditure is not limited by external factors.Although it can expand and stabilize the profit of e-commerce logistics service provider,it also makes e-commerce logistics service provider lose.Monitoring and restriction.

关 键 词：电子商务 物流服务 供应链 主从博弈 

分 类 号：F223[经济管理—国民经济]