控股股东控制权、现金流权分离对企业研发投入的影响研究——基于产权所有制和股权制衡视角  

Effects of Inequality Between Ultimate Control Rights and Cash Rights on R&D Investment——Based on Ownership and Equity Balance

作　　者：高宏进一 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学金融学院

出　　处：《浙江金融》2019年第11期41-48,10,共9页Zhejiang Finance

摘　　要：上市公司控股股东利用金字塔式股权结构实现自身控制权与现金流权的分离,依靠控制权占用企业发展资金来满足私有收益,影响企业的研发投入。本文选取2012~2017年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,进行回归分析,发现控股股东两权分离对企业研发投入有负向效应,进一步地,股权制衡呈现削弱这种负向效应,控股股东两权分离现象在民营企业中更明显,而股权性质对这种负向效应没有显著影响。最后就针对解决“第二类代理问题”提出建议。Under the framework of corporate pyramids,ultimate controllers may expropriate the enterprise development fund through“tunneling”based on inequality between ultimate control rights and cash rights,which could decrease the R&D investment.This paper selects the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as a sample,and uses multiple regression for data analysis.It finds that the separation of the two rights of the controlling shareholder has a negative effect on the R&D investment of the enterprise.Further,the balance of equity has weakened this negative effect.The separation of the two rights is more obvious in the private enterprise,and there is no significant evidence shows that the ownership may decrease the negative effect on the R&D investment of the enterprise.Finally,suggestions are made to solve the"second type of agency problem."

关 键 词：两权分离 研发投入 股权制衡 产权所有制 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F275