制造商回收成本信息不对称下零售商激励合同设计  

Designing incentive contract for a retailer under asymmetric information of manufacturer’s collection cost

作　　者：张盼 熊中楷 ZHANG Pan;XIONG Zhong-kai(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330031 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2019年第4期144-150,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271225);江西省社会科学规划项目

摘　　要：在一个制造商进行回收再制造的闭环供应链中,当制造商的回收成本信息是不对称时,考虑到供应链成员终止交易的情况,研究了零售商的最优两部定价合同设计问题,并探讨了该合同的性质以及回收成本信息不对称对整个闭环供应链的影响。研究发现:当制造商的回收效率较低时,制造商与零售商之间不会发生交易。当制造商的回收效率较高时,零售商使用两部定价合同菜单可以实现对制造商的信息揭露和激励,且制造商和零售商的利润随着回收效率降低而降低;信息不对称在大多数情况下会使制造商的利润增加,零售商和供应链的利润减少,还会使回收率和供应链成员间的交易机会减少。最后,通过算例分析得到两部定价合同可以近似协调信息不对称的闭环供应链。Driven by economic incentives,social pressure,and legislation,an increasing number of manufacturers are engaging in the operation of collecting and remanufacturing.In this paper,we consider a closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting and remanufacturing used products.Moreover,the manufacturer’s collecting cost information is private and cannot be observed exactly by the manufacturer.We aim to study the optimal incentive contract for the retailer by using the Information Screening Theory.In detail,we examine a two-part contract which includes margin revenue and transfer payment,and investigate the following questions:What is the optimal form of the two-part contract under the case of information asymmetry?What are the characteristics of the optimal contract and what is the impact of asymmetric information on the closed-loop supply chain?We first investigate the optimal two-part contract as a benchmark under the case of symmetric information,i.e.,the retailer knows the value of the manufacturer’s collection efficiency.In this case,the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader and provides the two-part contract to the manufacturer.The manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower and decides the wholesale price and collection rate.By using a standard backward induction technique,we derive the retailer’s optimal contract and the manufacturer’s optimal decisions.Next,we study the contract designing under the case of asymmetric information,i.e.,the retailer does not know the manufacturer’s information on collection efficiency.In this case,the retailer first offers a menu of contracts to the manufacturer,and then the manufacturer announces its collection efficiency and chooses the corresponding contract.To ensure that the manufacturer declares its true cost information,we can derive the incentive compatibility constraint according to the Revelation Principle.Moreover,to ensure that the manufacturer earns more profit than its reservation profit,we can derive the individual rationality constraint.Given

关 键 词：闭环供应链 信息不对称 显示原理 合同设计 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]