完全理性与互惠偏好下PPP项目控制权激励模型比较研究:基于私人部门之间的控制权配置  

A comparative study of motivation model of PPP control rights under entirely rational and reciprocal preference: Based on the allocation of control rights among private sectors

作　　者：张云华[1,2] 丰景春[1,4] 张可 严华东[5] ZHANG Yun-hua;FENG Jing-chun;ZHANG Ke;YAN Hua-dong(Hohai University Business School Nanjing 211100,China;Hohai University Institute of Project Management Nanjing 211100,China;Hohai University International River Research Centre,Nanjing 211100,China;Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization,Nanjing 211100,China;Jiangsu Engineering Consulting Center,Nanjing 210003,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]河海大学项目管理研究所,江苏南京211100 [3]河海大学国际河流研究中心,江苏南京211100 [4]江苏省“世界水谷”与水生态文明协同创新中心,江苏南京211100 [5]江苏省工程咨询中心,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2019年第4期151-158,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社科基金重点资助项目(14AZD024);国家社科基金青年资助项目(15CJL023);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2015B06214、2015B08214);江苏省水利工程PPP项目机制创新与政策建议研究(2015097)

摘　　要：目前PPP项目控制权分配的研究集中在公私双方之间,并未涉及私人部门之间的分配问题;且研究假设私人部门为完全理性经济人,忽略了私人部门在合作过程中的互惠互利社会性偏好。为此,将互惠性偏好植入私人部门效用和项目价值增值中,研究并构建私人部门之间的控制权分配激励模型,剖析两种视角下控制权分配对私人部门投入水平和PPP项目价值增值的激励效应差异,并对理论模型进行参数模拟和检验。结果表明:(1)完全理性视角下,私人部门控制权份额与基本投入产出、协同合作产出正相关,与投入成本负相关,控制权配置是一种结果导向型的激励策略;(2)互惠性偏好视角下,当控制权份额大于临界值时,私人部门几乎不进行基本投入和合作投入;当控制权份额小于临界值时,控制权份额与互惠性偏好程度、投入成本正相关,与协同合作产出负相关,控制权配置是一种兼顾过程和结果的混合导向型激励策略。Public-Private partnership(PPP)is an innovative cooperation model which introduces the private sector in the fields of public service and infrastructure.It has been widely used in various countries.The unreasonable allocation of control rights will lead to changes,disputes or even complete failure.Reasonable allocation of control rights is the requirement to improve the cooperative efficiency and the success probability of projects and to achieve a win-win result.There are two aspects in the allocation of PPP control rights:one is the allocation of control rights between public and private,and the other is the allocation of control rights in private sectors.The present researches focus on the former rather than the latter topics.The present researches also assume that the private sector is entirely rational“economic man”and ignores its reciprocal social preference in the process of cooperation.The private sector is in the social network where the multi-dimensional factors such as society,economy and policy coexist.Cooperative behavior between the private sectors is not completely based on its optimal utility,but on stability,social responsibility and increased reputation.Consequently,the private sector uses not only selfish rationality but also reciprocal social preference.Therefore,this paper studies and solves the problem of the allocation of control rights between the private sectors in the context of transfer actual,and the control rights by the government for the private sector.Firstly,the motivational model of the allocation of control rights under the perspective of entirely rational is established,and then reciprocal social preference is implemented.The optimal feasible domain of PPP projects from the perspective of reciprocal preference is provided.Through comparative study and under the perspective of entirely rational and reciprocal preferences,this paper discusses the impact of the share of control rights on the level of input and value-added project in the private sector.In the last,this paper co

关 键 词：PPP 控制权 互惠性偏好 项目价值增值 激励效应 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]