适应性治理:政策落地如何因地制宜?——以武陵大卡村的危房改造项目为例  被引量:17

Adaptive Governance: How Can Policy Implementation be Adapted to Local Conditions?

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作  者:石绍成[1] 吴春梅[1] Shi Shaocheng;Wu Chunmei

机构地区:[1]华中农业大学政治与文化研究中心

出  处:《中国农村观察》2020年第1期44-60,共17页China Rural Survey

基  金:教育部人文社会科学规划基金青年项目“生态宜居目标下农村环境的适应性治理研究”(项目号:18YJC630144);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目“中国地方政府环境治理风格研究”(项目号:2662017QD031)的阶段性成果

摘  要:因地制宜是国家政策得以落实的关键,是中国特色的治理经验。现有研究主要针对地方政府自身的特征与行为,而对其产生的结构性条件重视不够。本文试图将其理论解释拓展至制度、政府与社会关系等结构性要素,并建立了“适应性治理”的理论框架。该理论框架从过程逻辑厘清了因地制宜的发生情境、制度空间与实现机制。个案研究发现,武陵大卡村的危房改造项目发生在中央政策与地方实际双重约束的情境下,运作于“松散耦合”的制度结构中,并依赖政府与社会之间的委托代理机制。本文的研究表明,因地制宜主要是中国政策实施重视弹性规则的制度产物。Adjusting policy measures to local conditions is a key to a successful implementation of central government policies,and a unique governance model with Chinese characteristics.Existing studies mainly focus on the characteristics and behaviors of local governments,while ignoring the structural conditions of action.This article attempts to extend the theoretical interpretation from"agency"to"structure",such as institutions and government-society relation,to establish a theoretical framework of"adaptive governance".The theoretical framework clarifies the occurrence situation,institutional space and realization mechanism of acting according to circumstances.The framework is used in the analysis of a case study of the renovation project of dangerous buildings in Dakacun,Wuling Area.The project took place under the dual constraints of central policies and local reality,operated in a"loose coupling"institutional structure,and relied on the principal-agent mechanism between the government and society.The research reveals that the adaptation to local conditions is mainly an institutional product of China's policy implementation which emphasizes the role of flexible rules.

关 键 词:适应性治理 政策落地 因地制宜 危房改造 农村环境 

分 类 号:F324[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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