精准扶贫与地方政府行为转型  

Precise Poverty and the Local Government Behavior Change

作　　者：谢小芹[1] Xie Xiaoqin(College of Public Administration,Southwest University of Finance and Economy,Sichuan Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2020年第1期86-91,共6页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“乡村振兴战略背景下农村精准扶贫长效机制研究”（19CZZ035）

摘　　要：地方政府行为的相关研究从"治理""项目制"和"扶贫"等视角切入进行研究,得出其从"代理型政权经营者"向"谋利型政权经营者"、"汲取型"向"悬浮型"等的转变,权钱结合和"官商勾结"等具有解释力的结论。作为一项新型资源供给方式,精准扶贫呈现出政策性、整体性、系统性和全局性特质,其正在重塑一种新型地方政府。广西攸县是其中的典型之一,主要表现为群众路线的重拾、新型行政文化的塑造、国家基层治理秩序的奠基和新型政治生态的营造,政府的强干预及政社间关系的"互嵌"性有利于扶贫目标早日实现。Researches of the local government behavior carried on researches from the "governance", "project scheme" and "poverty alleviation" visual Angle,draw it from the "agent regime type operators" to "profit regime type operator", "learning" to "suspended" and so on changes, and combining of power and money and "collusion" conclusionswith explanatory power.However, the research focus less on precision for poverty alleviation and the selectivity of affinity behavior change of local government.As a new type of resource supply,targeted poverty alleviation is characterized by policy,integrity,systematicness and overarching characteristics. It is reshaping a new type of local government.

关 键 词：精准扶贫 政府行为 政民关系 

分 类 号：F323.8[经济管理—产业经济] D630[政治法律—政治学]