多目标斯坦克尔伯格模型的云南电网公司综合后勤服务平台建设  

Build a integrated logistics service platform of Yunnan Power Grid Corporation based on multi-objective Stackelberg model

作　　者：李娟 谭锐冬 尹代红 Li Juan;Tan Ruidong;Yin Daihong(Information Center of Yunnan Power Grid Co.,Ltd.,Kunming 650217,China)

机构地区：[1]云南电网有限责任公司信息中心

出　　处：《国外电子测量技术》2019年第12期76-81,共6页Foreign Electronic Measurement Technology

摘　　要：介绍了多目标斯坦克尔伯格价格模型用于云南电网公司综合后勤服务平台建设,其是由一个或几个大型生产者和更多的边缘生产者组成的综合后勤服务平台。假设大型电网公司将采用寡头垄断战略,而小生产者将使用像伯特兰一样的战略。该模型是一个多目标利润最大化计划。多目标是转换成相同数量的部分,多目标斯坦克尔伯格以电力生产和供应为功能控制变量。然后是一组KKT条件考虑策略而得出生产者。测试结果表明,该模型成功产生的利润总额大于利润服务质量最大化模型,但小于共谋模式。This paper presents a Stackelberg price leadership model for simulating deregulated electricity markets consisting of one or a few large producers and a larger number of fringe producers.It is assumed that the large producer would adopt oligopoly strategy using their market power while the small producers would use Bertrand-like strategy.The model is a multi-objective profit aximization program.The multi-objectives are converted into the same number of partial Lagrangian functions with power production and supply as the control variables.A set of KKT conditions is then derived considering the game strategies of the producers.Test results show that the model successfully produces a total profit that is greater than the profit from a welfare maximization model but is less than that from a collusion model.Producers who adopt Cournot strategy are better off with higher profits as compared with marginal cost pricing.

关 键 词：多目标 斯坦克尔伯格模型 综合后勤服务平台 

分 类 号：TN91[电子电信—通信与信息系统]