基于SFAEGA的发电侧联盟竞价策略研究  

Research on Generator Side Bidding Union Strategy Based on SFAEGA

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作  者:孔淑琴 王宁 卢恩 王宣定 张荣权 Kong Shuqing;Wang Ning;Lu En;Wang Xuanding;Zhang Rongquan(Guangdong Power Trading Center Co.,Ltd.,Guangzhou Guangdong 510080,China;Beijing Tsintergy Technology Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100080,China)

机构地区:[1]广东电力交易中心有限责任公司,广东广州510080 [2]北京清能互联科技有限公司,北京100080

出  处:《电气自动化》2020年第1期95-97,118,共4页Electrical Automation

基  金:广东电力交易中心有限责任公司科技项目资助(编号:GDKJXM20173104)

摘  要:提出的竞价联盟策略双层模型考虑了自身成本、对方的报价行为、潜在联盟及电网运行等限制约束,其上层模型描述了在发电商非合作博弈环境下存在的合作博弈之间关系,其下层模型描述了计入网损安全约束经济调度出清。为了提高算法的收敛性能及更好地反映发电商的报价行为,提出了一种基于强化萤火虫算法的进化博弈理论方法求解该双层模型。最后,采用标准IEEE 30节点系统验证了所提算法在求解竞价联盟策略双层模型时的优越性、稳定性和收敛性,且验证了发电商的联盟行为可以提高发电商的收益,但存在风险。The two-layer model of bidding union strategy presented in this paper took into account such constraints as one’own cost,competitors’bidding behavior,potential union and power grid operation.Its upper model described the cooperative game relationship existing in the non-cooperative game environment of generation companies,while the lower model described the clearing of security constrained economic dispatch considering network loss.An evolutionary game approach based on strengthened firefly algorithm was presented in this paper for the solution of the abovementioned two-layer model to improve algorithm convergence and obtain good reflection of bidding behavior of generation companies.Finally,through adoption of the IEEE 30 bus system,the superiority,stability and convergence of the proposed approach in the solution of the two-layer model of the bidding union strategy were verified,and it was also proved that the union behavior of generation companies might raise their benefits but risks existed.

关 键 词:竞价策略 纳什均衡 强化萤火虫算法 进化博弈理论 

分 类 号:TM732[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]

 

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