智能机器人应有法律主体资格吗?  

Should Intelligence Robots be Qualified as Legal Subejects?

作　　者：成素梅[1] 高诗宇 CHENG Sumei;GAO Shiyu(Institute of Philosophy,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200025,China;School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院哲学研究所,上海200025 [2]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第1期115-122,共8页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB019);教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目(18JZD0013)

摘　　要：在现有的法律体系中,工具通常被当作是无任何自主性的人造物来对待,然而,这种法律体系在解决由智能机器人带来的法律问题时会陷入困境。智能机器人具有学习能力和一定的自主决策能力,它们拥有的"智能"是一种分布式的"涌现的智能"。它们已经不能再被当作纯粹的工具来对待,而是成为介于工具与人类之间的一类新型实体,应该赋予一定的法律主体资格。但在实践中,如何把多元的理论探索有效地转化为具体的实践应用,还有各种棘手问题需要解决。赋予机器人适当的法律人格,既不意味着把机器人完全当作人来看待,也不意味着人们从此可以不再对机器人的行动负有任何责任。从哲学上来看,提出新的法律人格理论和为人工智能立法需要进一步澄清人格和人性等概念之间的相互关系,进一步澄清机器人人格的限度等问题。The current legal system based on the dichotomy of tool and human being have got into a dilemma when it solves the legal problems caused by intelligent robots. It is an interdisciplinary question. The intelligence owned by robots is a kind of distributed "emergent intelligence". Such robots have ability of self-decision. They can not be considered merely as tools, but as a new kind of entity between tools and humans, they should be endowed with a special legal personality between "dependent personality" and "independent personality". However, there are many hard problems to be resolved in practice about how to transfer the diverse theoretical exploration into concrete practical application. Endowing robots with appropriate legal personalities does not mean treating robots as human being or allowing humans to abandon all responsibilities concerning action of robots. From the philosophical perspective, new legal personality theory should further clarify the relation between such concepts as personality, humanity and the like and the boundary of status of personality.

关 键 词：人工智能 智能机器人 法律主体 法律人格 分布式智能 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程] D90[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]