考虑用户切换行为的电力零售市场博弈模型  

Game model of electricity retail market considering consumers’ switching behaviors

作　　者：赵琛[1] 张少华[1] ZHAO Chen;ZHANG Shaohua(Department of Automation,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学自动化系

出　　处：《电力自动化设备》2020年第2期162-168,共7页Electric Power Automation Equipment

摘　　要：为了定量研究电力零售市场中用户在零售商间的切换行为对零售商竞价策略的影响,基于Bertrand竞争模型建立电力零售商参与零售市场竞价交易的博弈模型,其中引入市场份额函数反映用户切换行为;从理论上证明该模型纳什均衡解的存在性和唯一性,并采用非线性互补方法求得均衡解。算例仿真验证了所提模型的有效性,且用户的切换行为有助于缓解零售商在零售竞价交易中报高价的市场力滥用行为,进而提高电力零售市场的效率。In order to quantitatively study the impact of consumers’ switching behaviors among retailers on retailers’ bidding strategies in the electricity retail market,a game model of electricity retailers participating in bidding transaction of retail market is built based on Bertrand competition model,in which,the market share function is introduced to reflect the consumers’ switching behaviors. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solution are theoretically proved,and the nonlinear complementary method is adopted to obtain the equilibrium solution. The effectiveness of the proposed model is verified by case simulation,and the consumers’ switching behaviors can help to mitigate the market power abuse behavior of high quoted price of retailers in the retail bidding transaction,and further improve the efficiency of electricity retail market.

关 键 词：电力零售市场 零售商 BERTRAND模型 切换行为 博弈分析 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]