政府应如何补贴委托代理关系下的产学合作  

How the Government Subsidizes Industry-University Collaboration Innovation Under Principal-Agent Relationships

作　　者：姜睿思 谢富纪[1] Jiang Ruisi;Xie Fuji(Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2020年第2期40-47,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“创新驱动发展战略的顶层设计与战略重点研究”(15JZD017)

摘　　要：产出分享模式作为现实中主要的利润分配模式,可以对代理方产生一定的激励效果,但是想要更多的激励只能借助于外部力量,比如政府补贴。在委托代理理论的基础上,使用连续型生产函数提出按成本补贴的补贴方式,并且定量地给出补贴的力度。研究发现,在这样的补贴方式下,代理方可以按照合作总利润最大的目标去努力,并且随着补贴力度的增加,合作总利润将呈现出3个阶段:加速增长阶段、减速增长阶段和负增长阶段,较少的补贴刺激利润增加,较多的补贴反而使利润减少而且更有可能导致道德风险发生;此外,政府补贴可以发掘合作创新中的协同性,在补贴直接激励代理方的同时,代理方的额外努力也激励了委托方,从而进一步提升合作的总利润。As the main profit distribution model in reality,the output sharing model can produce some incentive efiect to the agent,but the desire for more incentive can only rely on external forces,such as government subsidy.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper proposes a cost-based subsidy method by using the continuous production function,and gives the strength of subsidy quantitatively.The study finds that under such a subsidy,agents could work towards the goal of maximum cooperative gross profit,and as the subsidy increases,the cooperative total profit will show three stages:accelerated growth stage,slow growth stage and negative growth stage,less subsidy stimulates profit increase,more subsidy makes profit decrease and more likely to lead to moral hazard.In addition,government subsidies can explore synergies in cooperative innovation,while subsidies directly motivate the agent,the agent's additional efiorts also inspire the client,thus further enhancing the total profit of the cooperation.

关 键 词：双边激励 双边道德风险 产出分享 定量补贴 委托代理 协同创新 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F204