医疗纠纷第三方调解的博弈策略分析  

Analyzing The Game Strategy of The Third Party Mediation in Medical Disputes

作　　者：贾琼 许丰[2] 李鲜 章德林[3] JIA Qiong(School of Economics and Management,Jiangxi University of Traditional Chinese Medicine,Nanchang,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]江西中医药大学经济与管理学院,江西南昌330004 [2]南方医科大学 [3]江西中医药大学大健康服务研究中心

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2020年第2期108-111,共4页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：江西省社会科学“十三五”(2018年)规划项目“江西如何建设中医药强省”(18WT20)

摘　　要：第三方调解在妥善解决医疗纠纷以及缓和医患双方矛盾等方面具有公信力较高及专业性较强的优势,已逐步成为医疗糾纷处理的主渠道。本文主要通过构建“患方一医调委一医方”动态博弈模型,探究在完全但不完美信息的条件下,医患双方对医疗纠纷解决途径的博弈策略选择,从而论证医疗纠纷人民调解的主渠道作用,为第三方调解破解医疗纠纷难题提供依据。The third-party mediation has gradually become the main channel for the resolution to medical disputes due to its high credibility and strong professionalism in properly solving medical disputes and alleviating contradictions between doctors and patients.The dynamic game model of upatients-people*s conciliation committee-medical institutionsM was established to explore the game strategy choices of medical disputes solutions between medical institutions and patients in complete but imperfect information,which can demonstrate the role of medical dispute mediation committee and provide basis for third-party mediation to solve the problem of medical disputes.

关 键 词：医调委 医疗责任保险 动态博弈模型 最优策略 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]