纵向并购的反垄断问题研究  

The antitrust issue of vertical merger

作　　者：黄庆余 HUANG Qingyu(School of Law,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2020年第2期106-112,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：国家市场监督管理总局《反垄断法》修订研究项目

摘　　要：纵向并购是否构成垄断,一直是反垄断执法机构执法上的难题。纵向并购通过把交易成本内部化提高经济效率的同时,也可能会造成市场封锁,妨碍市场竞争。虽然一般认为纵向并购应以效率作为审查,但我国《反垄断法》第27条对纵向并购审查标准缺乏明确的标准,给反垄断执法机构在审查上带来很大的挑战。结合反垄断法的立法目标及欧盟的域外实践,纵向并购的效率审查依据应以消费者福利为依据。Whether vertical merger is antitrust?It is hard issue for execution authority.Vertical merger not only can internalize transaction cost to increase efficiency,but also cause market foreclosure to impede competition.Although the standard of review for vertical merger is efficiency,PRC Anti-Monopoly Law art.27 lacks specific review standard.It causes a huge challenge for Chinese administrative execution authority to evaluate vertical merger effect.Combined with the goal of antitrust law and the practices at home and abroad,the standard of review for vertical merger is consumer welfare.

关 键 词：纵向并购 市场封锁 效率 消费者福利 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学] F271[政治法律—经济法学]