基层扶贫“微腐败”:生成逻辑与治理路径——基于交易成本政治学分析框架  

Petty Corruption in Poverty Alleviation at the Primary Level:Based on the Analysis Framework of Transaction Cost Politics

作　　者：廖金萍 廖晓明[1] LIAO Jin-ping;LIAO Xiao-ming(School of Public Administration,Nanchang University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330031)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《求实》2020年第2期37-45,M0004,共10页Truth Seeking

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“大数据视阈下官员财产公开路径研究”(16BZZ011);江西省研究生创新专项课题“乡村基层‘微腐败’生成逻辑与治理路径研究”(YC2019-B012)

摘　　要：扶贫工作中出现的基层"微腐败"直接影响着扶贫成效乃至农民的获得感,成为新时期反腐败工作的重点。基于交易成本政治学的分析框架,在多重、复杂的委托-代理关系和扶贫任务繁重的背景下,信息拥堵、机会主义和资产专用性引发了政治交易成本,同时诱发了"微腐败"问题。要改变这种政治效率低下、"微腐败"高发的状态,就要找到降低政治交易成本的方法。研究表明,可以从建立承诺机制、引入差异化竞争激励机制、完善乡村治理规范体系以及建设大数据共享平台等四个方面解决基层扶贫"微腐败"问题,提高精准扶贫成效。Petty corruption in poverty alleviation at the primary level directly affects the effectiveness of poverty alleviation and even farmers’sense of fulfillment,thus becoming the focus of anti-corruption in the new era.According to the analysis framework of transaction cost politics,in the context of multiple and complex principal-agent relationship and heavy task of poverty alleviation,information congestion,opportunism,and asset specificity have caused political transaction costs and induced petty corruption.To change this state of low political efficiency and frequent petty corruption requires to find ways to reduce the cost of political transactions.Studies show that the problem of petty corruption can be resolved through establishing commitment mechanism,introducing differentiated competition incentives,improving the rural governance normative system,and building big data sharing platform.

关 键 词：反腐败 “微腐败” 村干部 精准扶贫 交易成本政治学 权力约束 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]