精准扶贫中村干部集体腐败的形成机理及治理路径  

Formation Mechanism and Governance Path of Collective Corruption of Village Cadres in Targeted Poverty Alleviation

作　　者：许晓 季乃礼[1] XU Xiao;JI Naili

机构地区：[1]南开大学周恩来政府管理学院

出　　处：《湖北民族大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第2期35-43,共9页Journal of Hubei Minzu University：Philosophy and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国政治伦理思想通史”(16ZDA104);2019年南开大学博士研究生科研创新基金资助项目“脱贫攻坚背景下驻村帮扶机制研究”

摘　　要：在脱贫攻坚的收官阶段,村干部集体腐败现象威胁到贫困治理目标的实现。从类型学上看,精准扶贫领域的村干部集体腐败主要有横向腐败同盟及混合腐败同盟两种。前者的形成与关系型的乡村社会紧密相关,后者的形成则是压力型体制下各级基层干部非正式互动长期累积的结果。同时,二者又均内生于失衡的村庄权力格局之中,因而具有极强的顽固性。治理这一系统性问题,可以从上下两个方向推进,既要依靠嵌入于乡村治理结构的外部力量,充分发挥驻村干部的监督控权效力,推动国家监管力量的下沉,也要注重村庄内部村民主体作用的提升,形成自觉抵制腐败的社会风气。In the final stage of poverty alleviation,the collective corruption of village cadres hinders the achievement of goals of poverty alleviation.From the perspective of typology,the collective corruption of village cadres in the field of targeted poverty alleviation mainly includes two types:horizontal corruption alliance and mixed corruption alliance.The formation of the former is closely related to the relationship in rural society,while the formation of the latter is the result of long-term accumulation of informal interactions among local cadres at all levels under the pressure system.At the same time,being endogenous to the imbalanced village power structure,both of them are extremely stubborn.Therefore,solutions to the problem are as follows:one is to rely on external forces embedded in the rural governance structure and give full play to the effectiveness of supervision and control of cadres residing in the village,the other is to pay attention to the promotion of the role of villagers within the village to build a social atmosphere that consciously resists corruption.

关 键 词：精准扶贫 村官腐败 乡村治理 治理能力现代化 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F323.8[政治法律—中共党史]