农地抵押与信誉监管能否缓解农户信贷高利率困境?——基于人为田野实验的检验  

Can Farmland Mortgage and Credit Supervision Ease the Dilemma of High Interest Rate of Farmers'Credit?

作　　者：梁杰[1] 高强[1] 汪艳涛 Liang Jie;Gao Qiang;Wang Yantao(College of Management,Ocean University of China,Shandong Qingdao 266100,China;Business School,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Shandong Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100 [2]青岛理工大学商学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2020年第2期91-99,共9页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“农户分化背景下需求导向型农技推广机制研究”(71273248);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“新时代绿色金融创新影响农村生态文明建设的内在机理、效应测度与政策仿真研究”(19YJCZH150);山东省社会科学规划研究项目“新旧动能转换背景下绿色金融发展的现实障碍与破解路径研究”(18CJJJ16)。

摘　　要：构建不完全信息动态博弈和重复博弈模型,设计人为田野实验,探究农地抵押与信誉监管机制对于缓解农村信贷高利率困境的不同作用。研究结果发现:第一,利率调节在无抵押担保的信贷交易市场中失灵,农户道德风险极易导致农户与农村金融机构陷入“囚徒困境”。第二,农地抵押价值较低时,高利率政策会导致农村信贷市场呈现“柠檬市场”特征,农村金融机构占优策略是实施严格的农村信贷数量配给。第三,提高农地抵押价值可以缓解农村信贷市场的数量配给,但难以帮助农户走出信贷交易中的高利率困境。第四,信誉监管机制可以促使农村金融机构以农户接受的合理利率与农户实现长期合作,但也面临着农户项目经营失败无力还贷的风险。第五,农地抵押与信誉监管耦合推进是帮助农户走出信贷交易高利率困境、实现农户与农村金融机构长期互利共赢的有效举措。By Constructing incomplete information dynamic game and repeated game model,designing artificial field experiments,and deeply exploring the different roles of farmland mortgage and credit supervision mechanism to alleviate the high interest rate dilemma of rural credit,the results show that:firstly,interest rate adjustment fails in the credit trading market of unsecured secured,and the moral hazard of farmers is likely to cause farmers and rural financial institutions falling into the"prisoner's dilemma".Secondly,the high interest rate policy will lead to the"lemon market"in the rural credit market.The rural financial institution's dominant strategy is to implement strict rural credit rationing.Thirdly,increasing the value of farmland mortgages can alleviate the quantity rationing of rural credit markets,but it is difficult to help farmers get out the high interest rate dilemma in credit transactions.Fourthly,the credit supervision mechanism can encourage rural financial institutions to achieve long-term cooperation with farmers at reasonable interest rates accepted by farmers,but it also faces the risk of farmers failing to repay loans.Fifthly,the coupling of farmland mortgage and credit supervision is an effective measure to help farmers get out of the high interest rate dilemma of credit transactions and realize long-term mutual benefit and win-win between farmers and rural financial institutions.

关 键 词：农地抵押 信誉监管 利率 博弈 人为田野实验 

分 类 号：F304.1[经济管理—产业经济]