基于环境质量偏好的纵向产品创新策略及消费政策研究  

A Study on Vertical Product Innovation Strategy and Consumer Policy Based on Environmental Quality Preference

作　　者：冯磊东 Feng Leidong(College of Business,Jiaxing University,Jiaxing,Zhejiang 314001)

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院商学院,浙江嘉兴314001

出　　处：《嘉兴学院学报》2020年第2期102-113,共12页Journal of Jiaxing University

基　　金：浙江省教育厅科研资助项目(Y201738231);浙江省教育科学规划课题(2018SCG058);浙江省软科学研究计划资助项目(2019C25012);嘉兴学院人文社科青年学术骨干研究课题(CD70119053);嘉兴学院科研启动费项目(70516052)。

摘　　要：在纵向差异化的绿色市场中,构建双寡头企业的两阶段动态博弈模型,考察政府消费政策实施对企业产品创新的各项策略变量以及社会福利的影响;并以新能源汽车和传统燃油汽车为例,阐明相关结论对我国汽车市场的消费政策启示。研究表明:当政府实施消费补贴或消费税政策时,需要依据污染的边际破坏程度而定。在较低的边际破坏参数下,对购买绿色产品的消费者以奖赏的形式予以补贴是最优的环保政策。而边际破坏程度较高时,对棕色产品购买者征收消费税加以惩罚是行之有效的措施,这既能降低环境污染,又能提高产品的平均环境质量,有利于社会福利的提升。In this paper, we construct a two-stage dynamic game model of duopoly in the vertical differentiated green market to examine the influence of government’s implementation of consumer policies on various strategic variables and social welfare. We take new energy vehicles and traditional fuel-engined vehicles as examples to illustrate the revelation from the relevant conclusions on the consumer policy of China’s auto market. The research shows that the implementation of consumption subsidy or consumption tax policies needs to be in accord with the marginal damage degree of pollution. When the marginal damage degree is relatively low, the best environmental policy is to subsidize for purchasing green products as a way to reward the consumer;while when the marginal damage degree is relatively high, the consumption tax imposed on the purchaser of brown products is an effective measure to reduce environment pollution and improve the average environmental quality as well as social welfare.

关 键 词：纵向差异化 环境质量 消费政策 固定成本 社会福利 

分 类 号：U469.7[机械工程—车辆工程]