基于委托代理理论的城市综合管廊PPP项目政府补贴研究  

Research on Government Subsidies for PPP Projects in Urban Comprehensive Corridor Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：张宏[1] 董爱 ZHANG Hong;DONG Ai(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Architecture,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京建筑大学经管学院,北京100044

出　　处：《价值工程》2020年第6期40-43,共4页Value Engineering

基　　金：北京建筑大学研究生创新项目资助,项目编号:PG2019083。

摘　　要：城市综合管廊PPP项目的政府补贴问题关系到社会资本方的服务质量和激励效果,本文首先进行委托代理理论的适用性分析,然后建立基于委托代理理论的政府补贴模型,并对模型进行求解。最后结合实际案例进行验证,得到该模型下的政府补贴额较合约金额少,具有一定的激励作用,为城市综合管廊PPP项目的政府补贴决策者提供理论依据。The issue of government subsidies for PPP projects in urban integrated corridors is related to the service quality and incentive effects of the social capital side. This paper first analyzes the applicability of the principal-agent theory, and then establishes a government subsidy model based on the principal-agent theory and solves the model. Finally, it is verified with actual cases that the government subsidy amount under this model is less than the contract amount, which has a certain incentive effect, and provides a theoretical basis for government subsidy decision makers for urban comprehensive corridor PPP projects.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 城市综合管廊 PPP 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F213.2[经济管理—国民经济]