国有企业双重目标与投资效率改进——基于独立董事网络和国企混改视角  

Dual Objectives of State-Owned Enterprises and Improvement of Investment Efficiency--A Perspective on Social Networks of Independent Directors and Mixed-Ownership Reform

作　　者：刘超 徐丹丹[2] 郑忱阳 LIU Chao;XU Dan-dan;ZHENG Chen-yang(School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;School of Economics,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029 [2]北京工商大学经济学院,北京100048

出　　处：《经济体制改革》2020年第1期111-118,共8页Reform of Economic System

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“国有企业分类改革的理论逻辑与实施路径研究”(16AJY010)。

摘　　要：立足国有企业具有社会和经济双重目标的理论逻辑,本文选取2007~2016年A股国有上市公司作为研究样本,分析了独立董事网络和国有股比例对投资效率的影响以及调节效应。研究发现:独立董事网络降低了国有上市公司的投资效率,较高比例的国有持股抑制了投资效率,但当国企更加关注经济目标时,则有助于改善投资效率;进一步研究发现,相比于特定功能类企业,独立董事网络在商业竞争类企业中发挥投资效率的改善作用更加显著。因此,独立董事应因地制宜在国企中发挥治理作用;政府应分类推进国企混合所有制改革;竞争性国企应引入较大比例的优质民营资本,优化投资决策、提高投资效率。Based on the theoretical logic of dual objectives of SOEs,using data of state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this study explores the direct and regulation effect of social networks of independent directors and state-owned shareholding ratio on investment efficiency.The research results show that an increase of network centrality of independent directors and state ownership in SOEs has a negative effect on investment efficiency.However,the negative effect could turn to positive when the firm pays more attention to economic goals.Furthermore,independent directors’social networks play a more important role in competitive companies compared to functional enterprises.Therefore,independent directors should play a governance role according to circumstance.Government should promote mixed-ownership reform based on classification of SOEs.Competitive SOEs should introduce a larger proportion of high-quality private capital in order to optimizing decision and efficiency of investment.

关 键 词：国有企业双重目标 国有股比例 独立董事网络 投资效率 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]